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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of altruism and spitefulness in a two-sided market in
which agents behave strategically and trade according to the Shapley–Shubik mecha-
nism. By assuming that altruistic agents have concerns for others on the opposite side
of the market, it shows that agents always find advantageous to trade. However, they
prefer to stay out of the market and consume their endowments when there are altruis-
tic agents who have concerns for the welfare of those on the same side of the market,
or when there are spiteful agents. These non-trade situations occur either because the
necessary first-order conditions for optimality are violated or because agents’ payoff
functions are not concave.
Keywords Bilateral oligopoly · Noncooperative oligopoly · Nash equilibrium ·
Altruism and spitefulness
JEL Classification D43 · D51
1 Introduction
We often incorporate the preferences of others in our decision making. We do so
because we intrinsically care about the welfare of other agents in the economy. In
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this paper, we continue a line of inquiry begun by Dubey and Shubik (1985) and
Dufwenberg et al. (2011) by investigating how altruism and spitefulness influence
equilibrium outcomes in imperfectly competitive markets.
We confine ourselves to a class of strategic market games introduced by Gab-
szewicz and Michel (1997), known as bilateral oligopoly.1 In this two-sided market
model, agents act strategically and trade according to Shapley and Shubik (1977)’s
mechanism (henceforth, Shapley–Shubik mechanism): they submit bids and offers to
the mechanism and the price is determined by the ratio of total bids to total offers.
The cornerstone of bilateral oligopoly is the assumption that individual agents’
behaviors are solely motivated by their personal concern. However, there is a con-
siderable amount of both experimental and empirical evidence that individuals do not
have independent preferences, in the sense that considerations of others influence indi-
vidual behavior. This paper departs from the traditional assumption of independent
preferences by assuming that agents act by considering both personal concern and
concerns for the welfare of others.
By following the growing literature on behavioral economics that constructs theo-
retical models with altruistic/spiteful agents (e.g., Levine 1998; Graziano et al. 2017;
Bourlès et al. 2017), this paper also assumes that an agent, who has a concern for
others, has an overall utility function which encompasses both his internal utility (that
is, a classical utility function defined over his consumption set) and internal utilities
of others weighted by preference parameters.2 Each parameter reflects the degree
of importance that an agent puts on the welfare of another: positive under altruism,
negative under spitefulness, and zero under the classic assumption of independent
preferences. We refer to this utility function as Edgeworth utility function (Edgeworth
1881).
Dufwenberg et al. (2011) show that concern for others does not affect equilibrium
outcomes when markets are perfectly competitive and agents’ preferences are rep-
resented by Edgeworth utility functions. In particular, they find that agents behave,
as if they had classical independent preferences at competitive equilibria. Dubey and
Shubik (1985) reach exactly the same conclusion with a continuum of agents in a
strategic market game. By contrast, we find that altruism and spitefulness affect the
volume of trade in bilateral oligopolies and, more interestingly, that this type of pref-
erences may shrink the volume of trade down to zero. This holds even when trade
produces high internal utility gains—a requirement introduced by Bloch and Ferrer
(2001) in response to the non-trade situations studied by Cordella and Gabszewicz
(1998). These findings are not in line with the conclusions reached in auction settings
(e.g., Levine 1998; Sobel 2010), according to which concern for others does not affect
equilibrium outcomes.
When agents have altruistic concerns for others on the opposite side of the market,
we show that a trade (Nash) equilibrium exists under assumptions that are common in
the bilateral oligopoly literature with independent preferences. As Bloch and Ferrer
(2001), we also make restrictions on marginal utilities to consider economies where
1 This basic model of trade has been also studied by Bloch and Ghosal (1997), Bloch and Ferrer (2001),
Dickson and Hartley (2008), Amir and Bloch (2009), among others.
2 For excellent surveys see, for instance, Fehr and Gachter (2000) and Sobel (2005).
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some agents have high internal gains from trade.3 This positive result can be explained
as follows. When agents have independent preferences and there are high gains from
trade, there exists a trade equilibrium. A property of the Shapley–Shubik mechanism
is that an offer by an agent produces internal utility gains for others on the opposite
side of the market. This translates, ceteris paribus, into utility gains for agents who
have altruistic concerns for others on the opposite side of the market. Therefore, this
type of altruism strengthens the incentives to trade and does not upset the conclusions
drawn under the assumption of independent preferences. Our new proof of existence
can be used to generalize Bloch and Ferrer (2001)’s existence result.
However, we also show that a trade equilibrium does not exist when agents have
altruistic concerns for others on the same side of the market. We provide an example of
bilateral oligopoly satisfying the classical assumptions on utility functions, as well as
the assumption of high internal gains from trade, for which the non-trade equilibrium
is the unique equilibrium. The economic intuition for this negative result is as follows.
A property of the Shapley–Shubik mechanism is that an offer by an agent produces
internal utility losses for others on the same side of the market. This translates, ceteris
paribus, into a utility loss for a supplier who intends to maximize the welfare of others
on the same side of the market. When such a loss is not compensated by a gain in
his internal utility, the altruistic supplier would prefer to offer nothing to the market.
We further clarify this point by providing a necessary condition for the existence of
trade equilibria. Heuristically, this condition requires that internal utility gains from
trade more than compensate for losses suffered by others on the same side of the
market. This result is in line with the previous literature on altruism which shows that
paradoxical situations arise when agents are too benevolent (e.g., Bergstrom 1989).
While there are many settings where agents are altruistic, there are also situations
in which agents aim to outdo other agents to improve their own standing. For this
reason, we also study bilateral oligopolies with spiteful agents, who are interested
in minimizing the welfare of others as well as in maximizing their internal utilities.
In this setting, we provide examples of bilateral oligopolies, satisfying the classical
assumptions on utility functions, as well as the assumption of high internal gains from
trade, for which the non-trade equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. In particular,
we explore the effects of spiteful concerns both for agents on the opposite side of
the market and for those on the same side of the market. Although spitefulness is
detrimental to the existence of trade equilibria, we find that these negative effects are
caused by two distinct factors.
In a setting where agents aim to minimize the welfare of others on the opposite
side of the market, the non-existence of trade equilibria stems from the fact that in the
Shapley–Shubik mechanism an offer by an agent produces internal utility gains for
others on the opposite side of the market. This translates, ceteris paribus, into a utility
loss for a supplier who intends to minimize the welfare of others on the opposite of
the market. When such a loss is not compensated by a gain in his internal utility, a
spiteful supplier would prefer to offer nothing to the market. By contrast, in a setting
3 A non-trade equilibrium, also called trivial equilibrium, always exists. To study trade equilibria, Bloch and
Ferrer (2001) introduce an assumption on the marginal utilities of all agents, similar to the Inada conditions,
which implies high internal gains from trade.
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where agents aim to minimize the welfare of others on the same side of the market,
we report that the non-existence is due to the non-concavity of the payoff functions.
Section 2 describes the theoretical framework and outlines the bilateral oligopoly
model, with results presented in Sect. 3. Section 4 concludes. The appendix contains
the proof of existence.
2 Mathematical model
We consider exchange economies with two types of agents, labeled 1 and 2, and two
(perfectly divisible) commodities, labeled x and y. The set of agents is I = I 1 ∪ I 2,
where I t is the finite set of agents of type t = 1, 2. An agent i is of type 1 when he is
endowed with x0i > 0 units of commodity x , but no unit of commodity y. Similarly,
an agent i is of type 2 when he is endowed with y0i > 0 units of commodity y but
no unit of commodity x . Therefore, agents of different types are on different sides of
the market, as they hold different commodities. We make the following assumption
throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 There are at least two agents for each type.
Agent i’s bundle (xi , yi ) is a (non-negative) two-dimensional vector describing
how much of each commodity he consumes. An allocation (x, y) = (xi , yi )i∈I is a
list of bundles. Each agent i maximizes the utility function:
Vi (x, y) = ui (xi , yi ) +
∑
j =i
γ
j
i u j (x j , y j ),
where −1 ≤ γ ji ≤ 1 for each agent j = i .4 Agent i’s utility function embodies a
private and a social component. The private component is represented by the internal
utility ui that depends on commodities that go directly to him. The social component
is instead represented by the weighted sum of the internal utilities of other agents.
Each parameter γ ji is the weight that agent i put on agent j’s utility, positive under
altruism, negative under spitefulness, and zero under independent preferences. Let
γi = (γ ji ) j∈I , with γ ii = 1, denote agent i’s preference parameters. The following
classical assumption on internal utilities is made.
Assumption 2 For each agent i ∈ I , the internal utility ui is continuous, strictly
increasing and concave on R2+. Furthermore, ui is continuously differentiable on
R
2++.5
4 Edgeworth (1881) calls the parameter γ ji ≥ 0 coefficient of effective sympathy, see Levine (1998) for a
discussion on the different interpretations of γ ji .
5 We assume continuous differentiability only on R2++ to allow the case of infinite partial derivatives along
the boundary of the consumption set (see Kreps (2012), p. 58).
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By following the approach developed by Bloch and Ferrer (2001), we consider
bilateral oligopolies in which there are high internal gains from trade, i.e., high gains
from trade with respect to internal utility functions.6 This is captured by the following.
Assumption 3 There exists an agent i endowed with an additively separable utility
function ui (xi , yi ) = u1i (xi ) + u2i (yi ) satisfying the following property: du
2
i (0)
dyi = ∞,
if i ∈ I 1, and du1i (0)dxi = ∞, otherwise.
Since the set of agents will remain fixed, an exchange economy with altruis-
tic/spiteful agents is denoted by (u, γ,w), where u = (ui )i∈I is the profile of
internal utilities, γ = (γi )i∈I is the profile of agents’ preference parameters, and
w = (x0i , y0i )i∈I is the endowment profile. An exchange economy in which agents
have independent preferences is simply denoted by (u, w).
In our model, agents behave strategically: each agent offers a quantity of his endow-
ment to the market. The strategy spaces are thus given by
Si = {ai : 0 ≤ ai ≤ x0i }, for each i ∈ I 1,
Si = {bi : 0 ≤ bi ≤ y0i }, for each i ∈ I 2.
We write (a, b) for the profile of offers ((ai )i∈I 1 , (bi )i∈I 2) and S for
∏
i∈I Si . Clearly,
(a, b) is an element of S. In addition, (a−i , b) is an element of
∏
j =i S j , with i ∈ I 1,
and (a, b−i ) is an element of
∏
j =i S j , with i ∈ I 2. For any profile of offers (a, b) ∈ S,
the bundles assigned to agents are given by the following allocation rule:
(xi (a, b) , yi (a, b)) =
(
x0i − ai , ai
B
A
)
, for each i ∈ I 1, (1)
(xi (a, b) , yi (a, b)) =
(
bi
A
B
, y0i − bi
)
, for each i ∈ I 2, (2)
if A = ∑i∈I 1 ai > 0 and B =
∑
i∈I 2 bi > 0. Otherwise, each agent consumes only
his own endowment. The ratio BA is the price of commodity x , whereas the price of y
is normalized to 1. The allocation generated by (a, b) is denoted by (x(a, b), y(a, b)).
The above allocation rule combined with (S, u, γ ) defines a bilateral oligopoly
with altruistic and spiteful agents, which is denoted by (γ ). We write  to denote a
bilateral oligopoly where agents have independent preferences. We adopt the following
solution concept of (Nash) equilibrium.
Definition 1 An equilibrium for (γ ) is a profile of offers (aˆ, bˆ) such that: for each
agent i ∈ I 1, aˆi ∈ Si maximizes
Vi (x((ai , aˆ−i ), bˆ), y((ai , aˆ−i ), bˆ)),
6 Bloch and Ferrer (2001) assume that the restriction on marginal utilities holds for both commodities and
for all agents.
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and for each agent i ∈ I 2, bˆi ∈ Si maximizes
Vi (x(aˆ, (bi , bˆ−i )), y(aˆ, (bi , bˆ−i ))).
Let (aˆ, bˆ) be an equilibrium for (γ ). The profile (aˆ, bˆ) is a non-trade equilibrium
for (γ ) if Aˆ = 0 or Bˆ = 0. The non-trade equilibrium always exists. The profile
(aˆ, bˆ) is a trade equilibrium for (γ ) if Aˆ > 0 and Bˆ > 0.
3 Altruistic agents
We start our analysis by considering altruistic agents who are characterized by positive
preference parameters. They aim to maximize their internal utilities as well as the
welfare of other agents.
Let us start considering the case, where agents have altruistic concerns for others
on the opposite side of the market. In such a context, a trade equilibrium always exists
as shown by the following theorem.
Theorem Let (u, γ,w) be an exchange economy satisfying Assumptions 1–3. For each
agent i ∈ I t , let γi be such that γ ji = 0 for each j ∈ I t\ {i} and γ ji ≥ 0 for each
j ∈ I\I t , for each t = 1, 2. Then, there exists a trade equilibrium for  (γ ).
The proof can be found in the appendix and it adopts techniques which are similar
to the ones used by Dubey and Shubik (1978) and Bloch and Ferrer (2001). Roughly
speaking, the proof consists of the following steps. First, we show the existence of an
equilibrium in a perturbed bilateral oligopoly using the Kakutani fixed point theorem,
which requires convex-valued best response correspondences. This requirement is
met whenever agents’ utility functions are concave. For this reason, we restrict our
analysis to altruistic agents having Edgeworth utility functions, which are concave,
because they are sum of concave functions. Alternatively, convex-valued best response
correspondences are guaranteed by assuming concavity over allocations. However, this
is a very stringent assumption (on this point, see Dufwenberg et al. 2011). Second,
using the Uniform Monotonicity Lemma of Dubey and Shubik (1978), we show that
equilibrium prices of each perturbed bilateral oligopoly are bounded away from zero
and from above. Note that this result cannot be obtained when agents have altruistic
concerns for others on the same side of the market.7 Third, we show that the equilibrium
strategy of the agent satisfying Assumption 3 is bounded away from zero in each
perturbed bilateral oligopoly. This result is inspired by Bloch and Ferrer (2001) and
the main novelty is the way in which the Kuhn–Tucker theorem is used. Finally, we
show the convergence of the sequence of perturbed equilibria to a trade equilibrium
of (γ ) when the perturbation goes to zero.
As a corollary, we obtain the following generalization of the existence result of
Bloch and Ferrer (2001) for bilateral oligopolies with independent preferences.
7 The reason is that an offer by this type of altruistic agents produces internal utility losses for others on
the same side of the market—in other words, inequality (4) in the proof of Lemma 2 no longer holds.
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Corollary Let (u, w) be an exchange economy satisfying Assumptions 1–3. Then, there
exists a trade equilibrium for .
The proof follows immediately from the theorem when γi is set equal to zero for
all agents. It is worth emphasizing that trade equilibria of a bilateral oligopoly with
altruistic agents are different from the trade equilibria of the corresponding bilateral
oligopoly with agents having independent preferences.
We now turn to the case where agents have altruistic concerns for others on the
same side of the market. In sharp contrast to the previous result, we show, by means of
an example, that a trade equilibrium may fail to exist, though the exchange economy
satisfies Assumptions 1–3. This non-existence result is due to the negativity of the
necessary first-order conditions for optimality.
Example 1 Consider an exchange economy with four agents having the following
utility functions and endowments:
V1(x, y) = √x1 + y1 + 12 (
√
x2 + 2y2) and (x01 , y01 ) = (4, 0),
V2(x, y) = √x2 + 2y2 + 12 (
√
x1 + y1) and (x02 , y02 ) = (4, 0),
V3(x, y) = √x3 + y3 + 12 (
√
x4 + y4) and (x03 , y03 ) = (0, 4),
V4(x, y) = √x4 + y4 + 12 (
√
x3 + y3) and (x04 , y04 ) = (0, 4).
Note that the exchange economy satisfies Assumptions 1–3. By checking the nec-
essary first-order conditions for optimality, it is straightforward to verify that the
non-trade equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the (γ ) associated with the afore-
said exchange economy.
The reason behind this non-existence result can be explained by focusing on agent
1’s utility function. From the allocation rule (1), the final quantity of the commodity
y assigned to agent 2 depends negatively on the quantity of x offered by agent 1.
Therefore, if agent 1’s gain from consuming additional units of commodity y does
not outweigh his loss from a decrease in agent 2’s consumption of y, then agent 1
maximizes his payoff by reducing his offer a1 to zero. This can be seen by considering
the derivative of the payoff function of agent 1 with respect to his offer a1, which can
be stated as follows:
∂V1
∂a1
= −∂u1
∂x1
+ ∂u1
∂ y1
B
A2
a2 − γ 21
(
∂u2
∂ y2
B
A2
a2
)
.
By substituting the marginal utilities of agents 1 and 2 as well as agent 1’s preference
parameter γ 21 = 12 of Example 1, one can easily verify that the above derivative is
negative and then agent 1’s best strategy is a1 = 0. It is well know that in the bilateral
oligopoly model, we have a trade equilibrium only when there are two agents offering
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each commodity.8 Since in our example, agent 1’s best offer is always nil, the non-trade
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium.
Heuristically, the non-existence result is due to the fact that agent 1 is too altruistic.
This is a well-known problem in the literature of altruism where, in extreme cases,
any reasonable connection between an agent’s utility level and his own consumption
is lost.9 The next proposition further clarifies this point by providing a necessary
condition on marginal utilities as well as preference parameters for the existence of a
trade equilibrium. We state this necessary condition only for the case where agents of
type 1 have altruistic concerns for others on the same side of the market.
Proposition 1 Let (u, γ,w) be an exchange economy satisfying Assumptions 1–3. For
each agent i ∈ I 1, let γi be such that γ ji ≥ 0 for each j ∈ I 1\ {i} and γ ji = 0 for
each j ∈ I 2. For each agent i ∈ I 2, let γ ji = 0 for each j = i . Then, if (aˆ, bˆ) is a
trade equilibrium, then
∂ui
∂ yi
∣∣∣∣
(aˆ,bˆ)
≥ γ ji
∂u j
∂ y j
∣∣∣∣
(aˆ,bˆ)
(3)
for some agents i, j ∈ I 1, with i = j .
The necessary condition imposes a restriction on the effects that concerns for others
have on an altruistic agent’s overall utility. It is worth noting that this condition is
similar in spirit to a restriction introduced by Bourlès et al. (2017) in a framework
where exchange takes place over a network structure. As already noted above, this
necessary condition is not a sufficient one, because equilibrium prices in the perturbed
bilateral oligopoly may be not bounded away from zero when agents have altruistic
concerns for others on the same side of the market (see footnote 7).
4 Spiteful agents
We now consider bilateral oligopolies with spiteful agents. Such agents are character-
ized by negative preference parameters and they aim to minimize the welfare of other
agents in the economy. Although there are high internal gains from trade, we show, by
means of examples, that a trade equilibrium may fail to exist when there are spiteful
agents.
We first turn to the case where agents have spiteful concerns for others on the
opposite side of the market. In such a case, the non-existence of a trade equilibrium
is due to the negativity of the necessary first-order conditions for optimality.
8 When a1 = 0, the allocation rule (1) implies that agent 2 can increase his utility by decreasing his offers
of commodity x , because for any a2, he gets all the amount B of commodity y offered in the market. In
such a case, the agent 2’s payoff function is not continuous on S2 and he does not have a best strategy.
9 See Ythier (2006) for an extensive discussion of the problem as well as the restrictions suggested by the
literature to rule it out.
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Example 2 Consider an exchange economy with four agents having the following
utility functions and endowments:
Vi (x, y) = √xi + yi − 12 (
√
x3 + y3) − 12 (
√
x4 + y4) and (x0i , y0i ) = (4, 0),
for i = 1, 2,
Vi (x, y) = √xi + yi − 12 (
√
x1 + y1) − 12 (
√
x2 + y2) and (x0i , y0i ) = (0, 4),
for i = 3, 4.
Note that the exchange economy satisfies Assumptions 1–3. It is possible to verify
that the non-trade equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the (γ ) associated with
the aforesaid exchange economy.10
The intuition behind this non-existence result can be explained by focusing on agent
1’s utility function. From the allocation rule (2), the final quantities of commodity x
assigned to agents 3 and 4 depend positively on the quantity x offered by agents 1 and
2. Therefore, if agent 1’s gain from consuming additional units of commodity y does
not outweigh his loss from an increase in agents 3 and 4’ consumption of commodity
x , then agent 1 may maximize his payoff by reducing his offer a1 to zero. This can also
be seen by considering the derivative of the payoff function of agent 1 with respect to
his offer, which can stated as follows:
∂V1
∂a1
= −∂u1
∂x1
+ ∂u1
∂ y1
B
A2
a2 + γ 31
(
∂u3
∂x3
b3
B
)
+ γ 41
(
∂u4
∂x4
b4
B
)
.
Heuristically, if the absolute values of γ 31 and γ 41 are high enough, then agent 1’s best
strategy is a1 = 0.11 The same argument applies to other agents. We thus conclude
that there is no strategy profile that can satisfy the necessary first-order conditions
for optimality, and therefore, the non-trade equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of
 (γ ).
We finally turn to the case where agents have spiteful concerns for others on the
same side of the market. In such a case, the non-existence of a trade equilibrium is
due to the non-concavity of payoff functions.
10 This can be verified by solving the necessary first-order condition for optimality with any computer
algebra system.
11 Recall that γ ji < 0 under spitefulness.
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Example 3 Consider an exchange economy with four agents having the following
utility functions and endowments:
V1(x, y) = 23 x1 + y1 −
1
2
(
√
x2 −
(
1
100
+ y2
)−2)
and (x01 , y01 ) = (4, 0),
V2(x, y) = √x2 −
(
1
100
+ y2
)−2
and (x02 , y02 ) = (4, 0),
Vi (x, y) = √xi + yi and (x0i , y0i ) = (0, 4), for i = 3, 4.
Note that the exchange economy satisfies Assumptions 1–3. In addition, note that
only agent 1 has spiteful concern for agent 2. It is possible to verify that the non-
trade equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the (γ ) associated with the aforesaid
exchange economy.
In the example, the strategy profile (aˆ1, aˆ2, bˆ3, bˆ4) = (2.46, 3.60, 0.44, 0.44) is the
unique solution to the necessary first-order conditions for optimality of all agents.12
However, this profile does not correspond to an equilibrium, because agent 1 can find
a unilateral profitable deviation. Indeed, the figure below shows the shape of agent
1’s payoff function when other agents offer (aˆ2, bˆ3, bˆ4). It is immediate to see that
agent 1’s payoff function is convex and aˆ1 corresponds to a minimum point. Therefore,
(aˆ1, aˆ2, bˆ3, bˆ4) cannot be an equilibrium and so the non-trade equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium of (γ ).
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study the effects of altruism and spitefulness in a bilateral oligopoly.
We prove that a trade equilibrium exists when agents have altruistic concerns for others
on the opposite side of the market. The intuition behind this positive result is that
12 This can be verified with any computer algebra system.
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incentives to trade are strengthened under this configuration of altruistic concerns.
By contrast, we show, by means of examples, that the non-trade equilibrium is the
unique equilibrium in all other cases analyzed. These negative results are caused by
the negativity of the necessary first-order conditions for optimality (as in Examples 1
and 2) and by the non-concavity of payoff functions (as in Example 3). Note that this
negative results hold even when we consider bilateral oligopoly in which there are
both altruistic and spiteful agents. For instance, one can consider a bilateral oligopoly
with four agents where agents 1 and 2 are from Example 1 and agents 3 and 4 are from
Example 2. In such bilateral oligopoly, the arguments on the first-order conditions
used above apply, and therefore, the non-trade equilibrium is the unique equilibrium.
Before closing the paper, we wish to call attention to two points. First, we confine
ourself to bilateral oligopolies with corner endowments in one commodity. We do
not know whether our negative results extend to models with interior endowments.
This is left for further research. Second, as in Dubey and Shubik (1985), one can
show that the equilibrium of a bilateral oligopoly corresponds to the competitive
equilibrium when there is a continuum of altruistic and spiteful agents. However, we
still do not know whether the equilibrium of a bilateral oligopoly converges to the
competitive equilibrium when the underlying exchange economy—with altruistic and
spiteful agents—is replicated. The reason for this is that the standard convergence
results do not apply (e.g., Lemma 4 of Dubey and Shubik 1978), even when there
exists a trade equilibrium. This is a fruitful research area for future works.
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A Appendix
The proof of the existence theorem is based on three lemmas which require the fol-
lowing preliminary result.
Proposition 2 Let Assumption 2 hold. For each agent i ∈ I t , let γi be such that γ ji = 0
for each j ∈ I t\ {i} and γ ji ≥ 0, for each j ∈ I\I t , for each t = 1, 2. Then, for each
i ∈ I , the utility function Vi is continuous, strictly increasing and concave on R2+,
and continuously differentiable on R2++.
Following Dubey and Shubik (1978), to prove the existence of a (Nash) equilibrium,
we introduce a perturbed game (γ ), with  ∈ (0, 1]. This is a game defined as (γ )
with the only exception that in the allocation rules (1) and (2) the ratio BA is replaced
by B+A+ , i.e., the price of commodity x becomes
B+
A+ . The interpretation is that an
outside agency places a fixed offer of  of both commodities. This does not change the
strategy sets of agents, but does affect the prices, the final holdings, and the payoffs.
We denote by (aˆ, bˆ) an equilibrium of the perturbed game (γ ).
In the first lemma, we prove the existence of an equilibrium in the perturbed game.
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Lemma 1 Let Assumptions 1–3 hold. For each  ∈ (0, 1], there exists an equilibrium
for (γ ).
Proof Consider an agent i of type 1 and fix the strategies (a−i , b) for all other agents.
In the perturbed game, the payoff function Vi (x(a, b), y(a, b)) is continuous, as B+A+
is positive for each  ∈ (0, 1]. Let
φi (a−i , b) ∈ argmax
ai ∈Si
Vi (x((ai , a−i ), b), y((ai , a−i ), b))
be the best response correspondence of the agent i . By the Weierstrass theorem, the
best response correspondence φi is non-empty. We now show that the correspon-
dence φi has convex-valued. Suppose that there are two feasible strategies a′i and
a′′i which belong to φi (a−i , b). We need to prove that a˜i = δa′i + (1 − δ)a′′i , with
δ ∈ (0, 1), belongs to φi (a−i , b). Since the strategies (a−i , b) are fixed, let us consider
(x(a, b), y(a, b)) as functions of ai , i.e., (x(ai ), y(ai )). Let (x ′, y′) = (x(a′i ), y(a′i )),
(x ′′, y′′) = (x(a′′i ), y(a′′i )), and (x˜, y˜) = δ(x ′, y′) + (1 − δ)(x ′′, y′′). Since the utility
function Vi is concave, by Proposition 2
Vi (x˜, y˜) ≥ δVi (x ′, y′) + (1 − δ)Vi (x ′′, y′′) = Vi (x ′, y′).
From the allocation rules (1) and (2), we have that xi (a˜i ) = x˜i , as xi (ai ) is linear;
yi (a˜i ) ≥ y˜i , as yi (ai ) is concave; x j (a˜i ) = x˜ j , as x j (ai ) is linear, for each j ∈ I 2,
and y j (a˜i ) = y˜ j , as it does not depend on ai , for each j ∈ I 2. But then
Vi (x(a˜i ), y(a˜i )) ≥ Vi (x˜, y˜) = Vi (x ′, y′) = Vi (x(a′), y(a′)),
as Vi is strictly increasing by Proposition 2. Thus, a˜i maximizes agent i’s payoff
function, and then, it belongs to φi (a−i , b). Therefore, the correspondence φi has
convex-valued. Furthermore, by the Berge Maximum theorem, φi is an upper hemi-
continuous correspondence. If we consider an agent i ∈ I 2, then the previous argument
leads, mutatis mutandis, to the same result and φi (a, b−i ) is a non-empty, convex-
valued and upper hemicontinuous correspondence. As we are looking for a fixed point
in the strategy space S, let us consider φi : S → Si . Let  : S → S, such that
(S) = ∏i∈I φi (S). The correspondence  is non-empty, convex-valued, and upper
hemicontinuous, because it is a product of non-empty, convex-valued, and upper hemi-
continuous correspondences. Moreover, S is a compact and convex set. Therefore, by
the Kakutani fixed point theorem, there exists a fixed point (aˆ, bˆ) of , which is an
equilibrium of the perturbed game  . unionsq
In the next lemma, we prove that the price of commodity x is finite and bounded
away from zero at an equilibrium of any perturbed game.
Lemma 2 At an equilibrium of the perturbed game (γ ), (aˆ, bˆ), there exist two
positive constants C and D, independent from , such that
C <
Bˆ + 
Aˆ +  < D,
for each  ∈ (0, 1].
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Proof It is straightforward to see that the proof provided by Dubey and Shubik (1978)
still holds. To establish the existence of C , consider an agent i of type 2. Following
the same steps adopted by Dubey and Shubik (1978), we can apply the Uniform
Monotonicity Lemma, as ui is continuous and strictly increasing, and we obtain the
following relationship on internal utility functions (see p. 10 in Dubey and Shubik
(1978)):
ui (xi (	), yi (	)) > ui (xi (aˆ, bˆ), yi (aˆ, bˆ)).
The parameter 	 is a feasible increase in agent i strategy and let (xi (	), yi (	)) and
(x j (	), y j (	)), for each j ∈ I 1, be the new corresponding bundles. Note that
∑
j∈I 1
u j (x j (	), y j (	)) >
∑
j∈I 1
u j (x j (aˆ, bˆ), y j (aˆ, bˆ)) (4)
as u j is strictly increasing, by Assumption 2, and y j (	) > y j (aˆ, bˆ), by allocation
rule (1), for each j ∈ I 1. From the two previous inequalities, and since γ ji = 0, for
each j ∈ I 2\ {i}, and γ ji ≥ 0, for each j ∈ I 1, we obtain that
Vi (x(	), y(	)) > Vi (x(aˆ, bˆ), y(aˆ, bˆ)).
Since (aˆ, bˆ) is an equilibrium, we obtain the same contradiction of Dubey and Shubik
(1978). By following their steps, we can then show that Bˆ+
Aˆ+ > C . To establish the
existence of D, consider an agent i of type 1. Then, the previous argument leads,
mutatis mutandis, to Bˆ+
Aˆ+ < D. unionsq
In the next lemma, we use the Kuhn–Tucker theorem to show that there exist two
positive lower bounds for the sum of equilibrium offers Aˆ and Bˆ of the perturbed
games. This lemma is crucial to prove that there exists a trade equilibrium for (γ ).
Lemma 3 At an equilibrium of the perturbed game (γ ), (aˆ, bˆ), there exist two
positive constants α and β, independent from , such that
α < Aˆ or β < Bˆ,
for each  ∈ (0, 1].
Proof Let (aˆ, bˆ) be an equilibrium of the perturbed game (γ ). We first consider
the case in which there exists an agent i ∈ I 1 who satisfies Assumption 3. Then, aˆi
solves the following maximization problem:
max
ai
Vi (x((ai , aˆ−i ), bˆ), y((ai , aˆ−i ), bˆ)),
subject to ai ≤ x0i , (i)
− ai ≤ 0. (i i).
(5)
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By the Kuhn–Tucker theorem, there exist non-negative multipliers λˆi and μˆ

i , such
that
∂Vi
∂ai
∣∣∣∣
(aˆ ,bˆ )
− λˆi + μˆi = 0,
λˆi (aˆ

i − x0i ) = 0,
μˆi aˆ

i = 0. (6)
By the assumption on the preference parameters, Eq. (6) can be written as
−∂ui
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
(aˆ ,bˆ )
+ ∂ui
∂ yi
∣∣∣∣
(aˆ ,bˆ )
Bˆ + 
Aˆ + 
(
1 − aˆ

i
Aˆ + 
)
+
∑
j∈I 2
γ
j
i
∂u j
∂ y j
∣∣∣∣
(aˆ ,bˆ )
bˆj
Bˆ +  − λˆ

i + μˆi = 0.
Note that the summation over j ∈ I 2 is non-negative, as u j is strictly increasing,
by Assumption 2, and γ ji ≥ 0, by the assumption of the theorem, for each j ∈ I 2.
Furthermore, the multiplier μˆi is non-negative, by the Kuhn–Tucker theorem, and
Bˆ+
Aˆ+ > C , by Lemma 2. But then, from the previous equation, we can derive the
following inequality which must hold in equilibrium:
−∂ui
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
(aˆ ,bˆ )
+ ∂ui
∂ yi
∣∣∣∣
(aˆ ,bˆ )
C
( Aˆ − aˆi + 
Aˆ + 
)
− λˆi < 0. (7)
Now, fix the strategies (aˆ−i , bˆ) and suppose that aˆi → 0. Then, we have that
∂ui
∂ yi |(aˆ ,bˆ ) → ∞, as
du2i (0)
dyi = ∞ by Assumption 3,
Aˆ−aˆi +
Aˆ+ → 1, and λˆi = 0,
as constraint (i) is not binding for sufficiently small aˆi . Moreover,
∂ui
∂xi
is non-negative
and has an upper bound, as xi (aˆ, bˆ) → x0i > 0 and ∂ui∂xi =
du1i
dxi with u
1
i being
continuously differentiable for positive xi by Assumptions 2 and 3. But then, there
exists an α > 0, independent of , such that the left-hand side of Eq. (7) is positive for
each aˆi ∈ [0, α]. Hence, since the inequality (7) must hold in equilibrium, aˆi > α,
and, a fortiori, 0 < α < Aˆ , for each  ∈ (0, 1]. We now consider the case in which
there exists an agent i ∈ I 2 who satisfies Assumption 3. Then, the previous argument
leads, mutatis mutandis, to 0 < β < Bˆ , for each  ∈ (0, 1]. unionsq
We can now prove the existence theorem.
Proof Consider a sequence of {n}n converging to 0. By Lemma 1, in each perturbed
game, there exists an equilibrium. Then, we can consider a sequence of equilibria
{(aˆn , bˆn )}n . Since S is compact and Bˆn +nAˆn +n ∈ [C, D], by Lemma 2, we can pick
a subsequence of {(aˆn , bˆn )}n that converge to (aˆ, bˆ) such that (aˆ, bˆ) ∈ S and BˆAˆ ∈
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[C, D]. But then, the strategy profile (aˆ, bˆ) is a point of continuity of payoff functions,
and then, it is an equilibrium of (γ ). The result of Lemma 3 implies that Aˆ > 0 or
Bˆ > 0. But then, since Bˆ
Aˆ
∈ [C, D], we can conclude that Aˆ > 0 and Bˆ > 0. Hence,
(aˆ, bˆ) is a trade equilibrium. unionsq
We finally prove Proposition 1.
Proof Assume that there exists a trade equilibrium (aˆ, bˆ). Then, aˆi > 0 for at least
two agents i of type 1 (see footnote 8). Consider the payoff maximization problem
for the agent i of type 1, such that aˆi > 0 [see (5)]. By the Kuhn–Tucker theorem and
the assumption on the preference parameters, the necessary first-order condition for
optimality of agent i can be written as
∂Vi
∂ai
∣∣∣∣
(aˆ,bˆ)
= − ∂ui
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
(aˆ,bˆ)
+ ∂ui
∂ yi
∣∣∣∣
(aˆ,bˆ)
Bˆ
Aˆ2
(
Aˆ − aˆi
)
+
∑
j∈I 1\{i}
γ
j
i
∂u j
∂ y j
∣∣∣∣
(aˆ,bˆ)
(
−aˆ j Bˆ
Aˆ2
)
− λˆi + μˆi = 0,
with μˆi = 0, as aˆi > 0, and λˆi ≥ 0, by the Kuhn–Tucker theorem. From the previous
equation, we can derive the following inequality which holds at any trade equilibrium
− ∂ui
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
(aˆ,bˆ)
+ Bˆ
Aˆ2
∑
j∈I 1\{i}
aˆ j
(
∂ui
∂ yi
∣∣∣∣
(aˆ,bˆ)
− γ ji
∂u j
∂ y j
∣∣∣∣
(aˆ,bˆ)
)
≥ 0. (8)
We now prove the statement of the proposition by contradiction and we suppose that
(3) does not hold for each i, j ∈ I 1, with i = j . This implies that the summation in (8)
is negative. Since ∂ui
∂xi
≥ 0 as the utility function is strictly increasing by Assumption 2,
then the previous inequality does not hold, a contradiction. unionsq
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